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Abstract. This paper discusses the dual interpretation of the Jeffreys–
Lindley’s paradox associated with Bayesian posterior probabilities and
Bayes factors, both as a differentiation between frequentist and Bayesian
statistics and as a pointer to the difficulty of using improper priors
while testing. We stress the considerable impact of this paradox on the
foundations of both classical and Bayesian statistics. While assessing
existing resolutions of the paradox, we focus on a critical viewpoint of
the paradox discussed by Spanos (2013) in the current journal.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the statistical literature, there is little debate as to whether or not testing
statistical hypotheses is the most controversial aspect of statistical inference, with
at least three major competing schools approaching the problem from different an-
gles and often concluding with opposite decisions. In this regard, Lindley’s (1957)
paradox may constitute the most quoted instance of the opposition between the
frequentist and Bayesian schools of inference. Two recent reassessments of the
paradox appeared in Philosophy of Science, with Spanos (2013) and Sprenger
(2013) diverging in their resolution of the paradox, which prompted me to recon-
sider in turn this fundamental argument both in the frequentist-Bayesian debate
and in the derivation of (more) coherent testing procedures within the Bayesian
framework.
Let me first recall the setting of the paradox as exposed in Lindley (1957), often
called the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox after Dennis Lindley pointed out the facts
were already exposed in Jeffreys (1939). Given a sample of size n from a normal
distribution N (θ, σ2) with known variance σ2, testing whether or not the null
hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 on the mean holds (against the alternative H1 : θ 6= θ0)
may lead to opposite conclusions depending on the statistical perspective adopted
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to conduct the test. Namely, summarising the dataset into the sufficient statistic
x¯n ∼ N (θ, σ2/n)
leads to the t statistic tn =
√
n(x¯n − θ0)/σ which is distributed as a N (0, 1)
variable under the null hypothesis, allowing for the computation of the p-value
equal to
p(tn) = P(|Tn| > |tn|) = 1− 2Φ(|tn|) ,
where P(·) is a generic notation for a probability computation and p(·) is the
symbol used here for the p-value function. Relying upon this p-value to deter-
mine (or decide) whether or not H0 holds means examining its numerical value
either in absolute terms (as suggested by Fisher) or with respect to a bound
(as suggested by Neyman and Pearson). A Bayesian approach to the hypothesis
testing problem, as exposed in Jeffreys (1939) relies on the ratio of evidences (or
marginal likelihoods) also called the Bayes factor (see Berger, 1985 or Robert,
2001). When the prior distribution on the parameter θ happens to be the normal
prior, θ ∼ N (θ0, σ2), the Bayes factor is given by
(1) B01(tn) = (1 + n)
1/2 exp
(−nt2n/2[1 + n]
)
,
which measures the evidence brought by the data in favour of the null hypothesis
relative to the alternative hypothesis. A decision about which hypothesis to select
is then based on the numerical value of B01(tn), the default boundary between
null and alternative being B01(tn) = 1, since the data then brings the same
evidence in favour of both hypotheses.
The paradox exposed by Lindley (1957) is that, for a fixed numerical value of
tn and for almost any choice of prior distribution on θ, the Bayes factor B01(tn)
goes to infinity with the sample size n while the p-value p(tn) remains constant
in n. In Lindley’s (1957) words, “we [can be] 95% confident [as frequentists] that
θ 6= θ0 but have 95% belief [as Bayesians] that θ = θ0” (p.187). This occurs for
instance when tn = 1.96 and n = 16, 818 assuming the prior weights equally both
hypotheses. (And for n = 164 if H0 is ten times more likely than H1.) Sprenger
(2013) takes the example of a test for extra-sensory capacities (ESP) to oppose a
p-value of 0.003 and a Bayes factor of 12 in favour of the null. This divergence of
outcomes is called a “paradox” since the same dataset almost certainly leads to
opposite conclusions and hence decisions when the sample size n is large. It led
many commentators of the paradox to conclude that one approach or the other
was “wrong”.
While divergences between different statistical theories of inference and their
numerical conclusions are to be expected, the surprising phenomenon that they
persist when the sample size grows to infinity explains for the long-term impact
of this paradox and the fact that it is still the focus of attention for statisticians
and philosophers of science alike. Although the frequentist-Bayesian opposition
expressed by the paradox can be thoroughly explained, as detailed in Section
2.1, the Jeffreys-Lindley’s paradox also has foundational consequences within the
Bayesian framework that are detailed in this paper.
Indeed, my personal apprehension of the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox is that
it points at the poor (and even unacceptable) behaviour of improper prior dis-
tributions when testing point-null hypotheses. An illustration is the resolution
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proposed in Robert, 1993, aimed at suppressing the impact of an arbitrary nor-
malising constant in improper priors. This perspective is exposed in Section 2.2,
while some possible Bayesian resolutions are indicated in Section 4, without en-
gaging the reader into a technical foray that would not bring further insights on
the concepts at work behind the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox. However, a large
majority of quotes and comments found in the literature view the paradox as
an irreconcilable divergence between the Bayesian and the frequentist resolu-
tions of the point-null hypothesis testing problem, blaming (at least) one of those
approaches for the discrepancy. This point of view is debated and criticised in
Section 2.1 and to a larger extent in Section 3. As the paper starts with an
analysis of the opposition between the p-value and the Bayes factor (see, e.g.,
Kass and Wasserman, 1996), I want to stress as a preliminary remark stage that
my Bayesian approach follows the decision-theoretic perspective advocated by
Berger (1985), which means that hypothesis testing is conducted with the intent
of a course of action (depending on the selection or rejection of H0) rather than
for the epistemic attempt of uncovering the “truth”, agreeing in this respect with
the position advocated in Sprenger (2013).1
The plan of this paper is as follows: it reviews the different perspectives on the
paradox in Section 2, it analyses and rebuts the recent criticism of Spanos (2013)
in Section 3, it studies some Bayesian resolutions of the paradox in Section 4,
and it concludes in Section 5.
2. SETTING THE PARADOX REFERENTIALS
2.1 Frequentist versus Bayesian interpretations
Let us recall that the classical view of the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox is that
the Bayes factor and the p-value asymptotically (in the sample size) differ to the
point of leading to opposite conclusions (acceptance versus rejection of the null
hypothesis H0).
There is obviously no mathematical issue with the paradox—otherwise it would
have been readily dismissed—: as the quantities involved in the two perspectives
evaluate different objects using different measures: the probability measure of an
event over the sample space versus the probability measure of an event over the
parameter space, the former being conditional on the parameter value and the
later on the observation of the sample. Despite the large literature on the topic, I
would also argue that this is not a statistical paradox based on the argument that
observing a constant value2 of tn as n increases is not of statistical interest: when
H0 is true, tn has a limiting N (0, 1) distribution, which means the corresponding
p-value has a limiting uniform distribution, while, when H0 does not hold, tn
converges almost surely to∞, in which case both the Bayes factor and the p-value
converge to 0. This behaviour is completely in line with the general result of the
consistency of the Bayes factor in this setting, which is all too often overlooked in
most commentaries on the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox. And the Neyman–Pearson
(frequentist) approach to testing suggests decreasing both the Type I and Type
1Due to this stance, I sometimes refer to the Bayes factor as a ”testing procedure” or even
as a ”test”, meaning it is the central tool to conduct the test.
2As pointed out by Lindley (1957): “5% in to-day’s small sample does not mean the same as
5% in to-morrow’s large one” (p.189).
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II error, hence also decreasing the acceptance boundary for the p-value when n
increases (see, e.g., Lehmann and Casella, 1988).
There are arguably several reasons why the two approaches, Bayesian
¯
and
frequentist (f), should not numerically agree, even asymptotically. Those reasons
all revolve around the central feature that the Bayesian perspective is the only
one that allows probabilistic conditioning on the observed value xobs and solely
on that value:
(a) one approach
¯
operates on the parameter space Θ, the range of the possible
values of θ under the alternative, while the other (f) is produced exclusively
on the sample space X under the null. They are thus covering incompatible
events. The same opposition occurs between confidence (f) and credibility
¯
when constructing interval estimators (a point also made by Sprenger,
2013);
(b) one (f) relies solely on the point-null hypothesis H0 and on the sampling
distribution it induces, making an evaluation like the p-value absolute, while
the other
¯
opposes the null H0 and its model to a marginal version of the
models corresponding to H1 (in the sense that those models are integrated
over the parameter space Θ against a specific prior distribution), which
implies that the Bayes factor and the posterior probability ofH0 are relative;
(c) reproducing what may be the most famous quote from Jeffreys (1939, Sec-
tion 7.2) one (f) could reject “a hypothesis that may be true (...) because
it has not predicted observable results that have not occurred” (which
means considering the event {X > xobs}, say, as the new focus of infer-
ence, rather than the sole observation xobs), in contrast with the other
¯
which manages to condition upon the observed value xobs. This implies, in
particular, that the former (f) cannot agree with the likelihood principle
(Birnbaum, 1962), while the other is almost uniformly3 in agreement with
it (Berger and Wolpert, 1988);
(d) at least in the Fisherian version of the frequentist perspective, one (f) resorts
to an arbitrarily fixed bound α on the p-value, while the other
¯
mostly refers
to a threshold set by the experimenter, rather than the default boundary
probability of 1/2. In the later case, unless a genuine loss function on the
consequences of a wrong decision or an unbalanced prior weighting vector
are constructed, both hypotheses are weighted equally and the boundary
signifies that the data favours one hypothesis versus the other in terms of
maginal likelihood values. This default principle is equivalent to using the
reference 0–1 loss (Berger, 1985) and to adopting the value 1 as the pivotal
value for the Bayes factor.
A consequent literature (see, e.g., Berger and Sellke, 1987) has since then shown
how divergent those two approaches could prove (to the point of being asymptot-
ically incompatible). Despite the fact that both approaches are consistent in the
sense mentioned above, most commentators on the paradox conclude by blaming
the p-value (always rejecting at a given α level for n large enough), or the Bayes
3Although I cannot digress further in this direction, the use of improper priors as discussed
in the following section is sometimes related to a violation of the likelihood principle since they
use the model to a further extent than through the likelihood function. However, that such
priors also face difficulties when used for testing hypotheses is not to be overinterpreted, as the
difficulty simply stems from their impropriety.
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factor (always accepting for a fixed p-value for n large enough), or both (see, e.g.,
Spanos, 2013, and Sprenger, 2013). Others (see, e.g., Gelman et al. (2013)) have
chosen to bypass the opposition by considering tools at the interface between
both approaches, like posterior predictive checks.
2.2 Improper inputs for Bayes factors
While the gap between the frequentist and the Bayesian degrees of evidence
was the reason for Lindley (1957) mentioning a statistical paradox, an orthogonal
consequence of Jeffreys’s (1939) and Lindley’s (1957) exhibiting this paradox is
to highlight the genuine difficulty in using improper priors4 in testing settings:
as stressed by Lindley (1957), “the only assumption that will be questioned is
the assignment of a prior distribution of any type” (p.188). This was also the
argument made by both Shafer (1982) and DeGroot (1982) (see also DeGroot,
1973) in their discussion of the paradox. Note that, as discussed in Robert et al.’s
(2009, Section 6.4) reassessment of his book, Jeffreys (1939) does not address
the general problem of using improper priors in testing, namely that the Bayes
factor may be undefined due to the lack of normalising constants in such priors
(Berger, 1985; Robert, 2001). Instead, he relies on ad-hoc if effective solutions
when available and more generaly sketches a second (and under-appreciated)
type of (proper) Jeffreys’s priors for testing statistical hypotheses.
This second (but not secondary) level of interpretation for the paradox shifts
the asymptotics from the sample size to a prior scale factor. If we remain within
the normal framework of Lindley (1957), with one observation x ∼ N (θ, σ2),
considering a prior distribution of the form θ ∼ N (θ0, nσ2) under the alterna-
tive hypothesis leads to a Bayes factor that is identical to (1) for tn = x. In
this perspective, n is a prior scale factor, so that the prior variance is n times
larger than the observation variance.5 The interpretation of the phenomenon is
then obviously different: when the prior scale n goes to infinity, the Bayes factor
goes to infinity no matter what the value of the observation x is. (Note that both
interpretations are mathematically equivalent.) Under this new light, n becomes
what Lindley (1957) calls “a measure of lack of conviction about the null hypoth-
esis” (p.189), a sentence that I re-interpret as the prior (under H1) getting more
and more diffuse as n grows. However, I want to stress once again that nowhere
in Lindley’s paper (nor in Jeffreys’s book) is the difficulty with improper priors
spelled out clearly.
In this (re-)interpretation of the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox, I consider that the
phenomenon exhibited therein is not paradoxical in the least: when the diffuseness
of the (alternative) prior (i.e., under H1) increases, the only relevant piece of
information becomes that θ could be equal to θ0, to the extent that it overwhelms
any evidence to the contrary contained in the data. For one thing, and as put by
Lindley (1957), “the value θ0 is fundamentally different from any value of θ 6= θ0,
however near θ0 it might be” (p.189).
6 In addition, letting n grow to infinity
4Improper priors are extensions of the standard probability measures on the parameter space
to infinite mass positive measures in order to reach more procedures and to close the inferential
scope in several senses, see, e.g., Robert (2001).
5In terms of de Finetti’s imaginary observations, the prior corresponds to the information
brought by n less imaginary observations than the real observations.
6We will get return to this fundamental remark in the discussion of Spanos (2013) in the
next section.
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means that the mass of the prior distribution in any fixed neighbourhood of the
null hypothesis and even in any set coherent with the data at hand vanishes to
zero. There is therefore a deep coherence in the selection of the null hypothesis
H0 in this case: being completely indecisive about the alternative hypothesis
means we could and should not choose this alternative. It is not possible to pick
the alternative hypothesis of an undefined value of θ when opposed to the very
special value θ0 if we want to be “completely non-informative” about θ under
H1. This analysis of the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox is justifying (further) the
prohibition of the use of improper priors for testing point null hypotheses and
selecting embedded models (found for instance in DeGroot, 1982, Berger, 1985,
and Robert, 2011).
Depending on one’s perspective about the position of Bayesian statistics within
statistical theories of inference, one might see this as a strength or as a weak-
ness since Bayes factors and posterior probabilities do require a realistic model
under the alternative when p-values and Bayesian predictives do not. A logical
reason for this requirement is that Bayesian inference need proceed with the al-
ternative model when the null is rejected. This Bayesian insight on the paradox
therefore leads to the requirement to handle testing statistical hypotheses under
limited prior information and within the paradigm. Solutions addressing this is-
sue are discussed in Section 4. Prior to this, we provide and rebut the arguments
given in Spanos (2013) that the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox actually highlights the
deficiencies of the Bayesian approach to testing.
3. DON’T BE AFRAID...
Under the rather provocative title “Who should be afraid of the Jeffreys-Lindley
paradox”,7 Spanos (2013) offers his frequentist reassessment of the paradox, ar-
guing against both Bayesian and likelihood ratio approaches and in favour of the
postdata severity evaluation he and Mayo have both been advocating since 2004.
Answering those criticisms was the starting motivation for writing the current
paper.
While I hope the reader is already familiar with the contents of Spanos (2013),
let me first recapitulate the main points made in this paper before embarking
onto a more detailed analysis of those arguments. Spanos (2013) compares the
frequentist (use of p-values), Bayesian (use of Bayes factors) and “likelihoodist”
(use of likelihood ratios) approaches to statistical testing, with the conclusion
that the latter two “give rise to highly fallacious results” (p.75), while the p-
value can be processed (or rescued) by the post-data severity analysis of Mayo
and Spanos (2004, defined below in Section 3.3)), escaping the Jeffreys–Lindley’s
paradox paradox. The paper insists on the ability of this method to exhibit a
certain degree γ of discrepancy from the null hypothesis, while Bayesian and
likelihoodist methods cannot and do not provide evidence for a particular alter-
native hypothesis (see, e.g., p.79). Spanos (2013) concludes that the paradox “has
played an important role in undermining the credibility of frequentist inference”
(p.91) as being ”vulnerable to the fallacy of rejection” (p.91) but that the Bayes
factor falls prey to the ”fallacy of acceptance”.8
7Given the contents of the paper, the author presumably intends Bayesian statistics or
Bayesians as the recipients of this question.
8The fallacy of rejection is “(mis)interpreting reject H0 (evidence against H0) as evidence
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In the following sections, I answer those criticisms by defending a decision-
based position on testing (Section 3.1), refusing the anti-Bayesian argument that
the Jeffreys-Lindley’s paradox only impact the Bayesian resolutions (Section 3.2),
before summarising and considering Spanos’ own solution based on severity (Sec-
tion 3.3) and on the need to calibrate the strength of the rejection (Section 3.4).
My conclusion about those arguments is that, while rejecting decisional premises,
the severity perspective is inherently depending upon a notion of significant dif-
ference (“substantive discrepancy”, p.88) or distance from the null.
3.1 A proper decisional framework for testing
The notion of evidence brought by the data in favour of or against an hypothesis
H0 is never defined by Spanos (2013), even though it is repeatedly mentioned
throughout the paper. More importantly, there is no argument made therein as
to what the specific purpose of conducting a test (against, say, constructing a
confidence interval) is. Spanos (2013) operates as though there were an obvious
truth (H0 or H1) and as though one and only one statistical approach could reach
it, despite the evidence to the contrary represented by the consistency property
of all three approaches in Lindley’s (1957) setting.9
Indeed, what differentiates statistical tests from other aspects of statistical in-
ference like point estimation is that (a) there is a precise question being asked
about the statistical model under study, prior to observing the data, and (b) the
answer to this question will impact the subsequent actions of the individual(s)
who asked the question. Point (a) relates to Lindley’s stress on the feature that
the parameter value θ0 is emminently special and quite different from any neigh-
bouring value. This value θ0 was selected for a reason and with a motive, brought
to the experimenter’s attention by a theoretical construct, and this as done prior
to the observation stage rather than suggested from the data. From a Bayesian
viewpoint, this ultimate specificity implies that prior information is available (to
a certain degreee) as to why θ0 is a special value of the parameter θ. Point (b)
is about assessing the consequences of the answer to the questions, especially
the wrong answer. Both from a frequentist and from a Bayesian perspective, this
assessment implies defining a loss or utility function that quantifies the impact
of a wrong answer and eventually determines the boundary between acceptance
and rejection.10
Spanos (2013) does not follow this decisional approach (which he considers as
a Trojan horse for validating Bayesian inference, see Spanos, 2012). This is for
instance the point made by the remark “the problem does not lie with the p-value
or the accept/reject rules as such, but with how such results are transformed into
evidence for or against H0 or a particular alternative” (p.76). Thus, the error
statistical approach he advocates (as further discussed in Section 3.3) does not
for a particular H1” (p.75), by which I understand for a specific value of the parameter under
the alternative hypothesis, and the fallacy of acceptance is “(mis)interpreting accept H0 (no
evidence against H0) as evidence for H0” (p.75).
9Ironically, the numerical example used in the paper (borrowed from Stone, 1997, also father
to the marginalisation paradoxes, see Dawid et al., 1973) is the very same as Bayes’s billiard
example (if with a larger value of n) and as Laplace’s example on births (with a similar value
of n).
10This is the simplest type of loss function: more advanced versions could include the case of
a non-decision, calling for more observations, as in Berger (2003).
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proceed from a decisional step, even when handling an accept/reject outcome,
but it instead requires the introduction of a secondary p-value threshold, the
severity evaluation, coupled with a parameter value (or deviation) that represents
a significant distance from the null, a “substantively significant” discrepancy
(p.88) in Spanos’ terms. In fine, this interpretation of testing relies on the use
of an implicit loss function that sets which value of the parameter is far and
which is not. For instance, when Spanos (2013, p.75) states that “there is nothing
fallacious or paradoxical about a small p-value or a rejection of the null, for a
given significance level α; when n is large enough, since a highly sensitive test
is likely to pick up on tiny (in a substantive sense) discrepancies from H0”, the
“substantive sense” can only be gathered from a loss function. In connection
with this notion of loss and of distance from the null hypothesis, Spanos’ side
remark that “what goes wrong is that the Bayesian factor and the likelihoodist
procedures use Euclidean geometry to evaluate evidence for different hypotheses
when in fact the statistical testing space is curved” (p.90) carries little weight.
First, it is mathematically incorrect given that the Bayes factor is invariant under
one-to-one reparameterisations of either the parameter or the sampling spaces,
hence impervious to the curvatures of those spaces11 and to the choice of a specific
geometry. Second, the severity alternative put forward by Spanos in this paper
rests upon the choice of a divergence measure d(X) which is most often Euclidean,
while the Bayesian and likelihood approaches rely on the likelihood function,
which does not rely on the choice of a (Euclidean or not) distance.
3.2 The paradox as an anti-Bayesian argument
Spanos (2013) argues that the Jeffreys-Lindley’s paradox is demonstrating
against the Bayesian (and likelihood) resolutions of the problem by failing to
account for the large sample size.12 As detailed in Section 2.2, I do not disagree
with this perspective to some extent: I indeed consider that the most important
lesson learned from Lindley (1957) is that improper priors require special caution
when conducting point-null hypothesis testing. There is indeed little sense in ar-
guing in favour of a procedure that would always conclude by picking the null, no
matter what the value of the test statistics is. However, as pointed out in Section
2.1, considering a fixed (in the sample size n) value of the t statistic has little
meaning in an asymptotic referential, i.e. when n increases to ∞. Either the t
statistic converges in distribution to the standard normal distribution under the
null hypothesis H0 or it diverges to infinity under the alternative H1. This is the
reason why both the Bayesian and the likelihood ratio approaches are consistent
in this setting.13
In an encompassing perspective about hypothesis testing, I do argue that the
Jeffreys-Lindley’s paradox expresses foundational difficulties for all of the three
11Spanos (2013, p.90 and p.91) uses the term “statistical space” without a proper definition.
It can be either the parameter or the sample space since there is no decision space in his axioms.
12His argument about the invariance of the Bayes factor to n (p.84) is found missing as the
Bayes factor does depend on n as exhibited by B(tn) above.
13Somewhat in connection with this point, I fail to understand why a Bayes factor would
“ignore the sampling distribution (...) by invoking the likelihood principle” (p.90): the Bayes
factor incorporates the sampling distribution by integrating it out against the associated prior
under the alternative hypothesis. There is no invoking involved and no likelihood principle at
play in the construction of the marginal likelihood, but solely an application of the rule of
probability calculus.
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methodological threads discussed in Spanos (2013): when following Fisher’s ap-
proach, there is a theoretical and practical difficulty as to how one should decrease
the acceptance bound α = α(n) on the p-value when n increases. This approach
fails to provide a working and logical principle from which this bound (or se-
quence of bounds) α(n) should be chosen. For instance, the paper objects (p.78)
that because “of the large sample size, it is often judicious to choose a small type
I error, say α = .003” when this argument simply points at the arbitrariness of
this numerical value. In the specific setting of this example of Spanos (2013), it
is much worse, in that this bound could have been dictated by the data itself
since the observed p-value is equal to the nearby .0027. In addition, I find the
argument of consistency unconvincing in that case since both the Bayes factor
and the likelihood ratio tests are then consistent testing procedures.
In the Neyman–Pearson referential, there is a fundamental difficulty in finding
a proper balance (or imbalance) between Type I and Type II errors, since such
balance is not provided by the theory, which settles for the sub-optimal selection
of a fixed Type I error. In addition, the whole notion of power, while central to
this referential, has arguable foundations in that this is a function that inevitably
depends on the unknown parameter θ. In particular, the power decreases to the
Type I error at the boundary between the null and the alternative hypotheses in
the parameter set. For instance, referring to Spanos’ (2013) arguments, giving a
meaning to the definition of severity (eqn. (25), p.87)
P(x; d(X) < d(x0); θ > θ1 is false) ,
where x0 is the observable and x should be X, seems impossible. The third
argument “θ > θ1 is false” that conditions this probability statement makes no
sense without a prior distribution on the parameter set.14 Even the corrected
version
Pθ1(d(X) < d(x0))
depends on the choice of the particular alternative θ1 or has to be seen as the
power function which, like the risk function (see, e.g., Berger, 1985), prohibits
most comparisons in a frequentist framework.
As discussed further in Section 2.2, if we abstain from discussing the genuine
difficulty in setting a joint prior distribution over two distinct parameter spaces,
following a standard Bayesian approach with a flat (uniform) prior distribution
on the binomial probability inferred about in Spanos (2013) leads to a Bayes
factor of 8.115 (p.80). Although this quantity is larger than one, the calibration
of the discrepancy from this threshold constitutes the central difficulty in using
Bayes factors towards decision-making, Jeffreys’s (1939) scale being highly formal
despite being often refered to (Kass and Wasserman, 1996).
3.3 Defending severity
Spanos (2013) rebounds on the failures (or fallacies?) of all three main ap-
proaches to address the difficulties with the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox to advo-
cate his own criterion the “postdata severity evaluation” introduced in Mayo and Spanos
14An exchange with D. Mayo (2013, personal communication) led me to conclude that this
probability is computed under the distribution of X associated with the parameter θ1, where θ1
is determined by the severity criterion, detailed in Section 3.3.
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(2004).15 I recall that an “hypothesis H passes a severe test” if the data agrees
with H and if it is highly probable that data not produced under H agrees less
with H (p.86). While this sounds a reasonable desiderata, the notion of severe
tests has been advocated by Mayo and Spanos (2004) over the past years, but it
has not yet made a dent on the theory or on the practice of statistical testing.
As examplified by the paper (see, e.g., Table 1 on p.88 and the discussion sur-
rounding it), this solution requires more (user-based) calibration than the regular
p-value and it is thus bound to confuse practitioners. Indeed, the severity eval-
uation as explained16 in Spanos (2013) implies defining for each departure from
the null, rewritten as θ1 = θ0 + γ, the probability that a dataset associated with
this parameter values “accords less with θ > θ1 than x0 does” (p.87). (Note that,
as discussed in footnote 15, the two-sided alternative has been turned postdatum
into a one-sided version. This is no more acceptable than stating that the date
always supports more the value at the maximum likelihood then at the null.)
The notion of severity is therefore a mix of p-value and of Type II error that
is supposed to “provide the ‘magnitude’ of the warranted discrepancy from the
null” (p.88), i.e. to decide about how close (in distance) to the null we can get
and still be able to discriminate the null from the alternative hypotheses “with
very high probability” (p.86). The description found in Section 6 of Spanos (2013)
implies a rejection of H0 for the data at hand, based on the comparison of the
p-value with an acceptance bound, as in Fisher’s perspective, followed by an
assessment of “the largest discrepancy γ from H0 warranted by data x0”, which
derives a boundary parameter value θ1 from a severity level, .9 say. This amounts
to selecting a minimal power or maximal Type II error and to check for the
corresponding discrepancy to be “substantively significant” (p.88), an assessment
provided by the user and thus defeating the original purpose of the approach. The
error statistical approach is therefore ineffective as an operational tool, because
of this double calibration that is required from the user. Once more, as detailed
in Spanos (2013), the value of this closest discrepancy γ—which is thus a bound
on where we can discriminate between H0 and H1 for a given sample size n—does
depend on another arbitrary tail probability, the “severity threshold”,
Pθ1{d(X) ≤ d(x0)}
introduced in eqn. (25). This tail probability has to be chosen by the user without
being more intuitive or less subjective than the initial acceptance bound on the
p-value.17 Furthermore, once the resulting discrepancy γ is found, whether it is
far enough from the null is a matter of informed opinion since, as duly noted
15Section 6 starts with the mathematically incorrect argument that, since we have observed
x0, in connection with the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0, the sign of x0−θ0 “indicates the relevant
direction of departure from H0”. First, random variables may take values both sides of θ0 for
most values of θ. Second, the fact that one is testing H0 against a two-sided or a one-sided
alternative hypothesis pertains to the motivation of the test, not to the direction suggested by
the data. The contentious modification of the testing setting once the data is observed is a major
issue with Spanos’ (2013) arguments, issue that we will discuss further below.
16Typos in both the last line in p.87, which is mixing the standardised and the non-
standardised versions of the test statistic, and Table 1, which introduces a superfluous minus
sign, do not help in clarifying the issue.
17When considering the severity as a function of θ1, complement to a probability cdf in θ1,
its most natural interpretation would be of a Bayesian nature, the bound being then a prior
quantile. However, this solution is quite unlikely to meet with the authors’ approval.
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by Spanos (2013), whether it is “substantially significant (...) pertains to the
substantive subject matter” (p.88), implying once again some sort of loss function
or of prior information that the paper fails to acknowledge.18
3.4 Falling afoul of the fallacy of rejection
In connection with the special meaning of the value θ0 and with the argument
of the fallacy of rejection, mentioned by Spanos (2013) as associated with the
p-value, several parts of his discussion of the Bayesian approach state (see, e.g.,
p.81) that other values of θ are supported and even better supported by the
data than the null value θ0. This is a surprising argument as (a) it pertains to
the construction of Bayesian credible intervals but not to testing and (b) it is a
direct illustration of the “fallacy of rejection” in that rejecting (or not) H0 does
not bring evidence in favour of a particular value of θ. While it is correct that
the observed data x0 does “favor certain values [of the parameter] more strongly”
(p.81) than θ0, those values are (a) driven by the data, i.e. will vary from one
repetition of the statistical experiment to the next, and (b) of no particular
relevance for conducting a test, meaning that the experimenter or the scientist
behind the experiment had not expressed a particular interest in those values
before they were exposed by the data. The tested value, θ0 = 0.2 say, is chosen
prior to the experiment because it has some special meaning for the problem or
the theory at hand. The fact that the likelihood and/or the posterior are/is larger
in other values of θ does not constitute ”conflicting evidence” (p.82) against the
fact that the null hypothesis holds. It simply reflects on the property that the
likelihood function is a random function of the parameter θ, whose mode also
varies with the data and is almost surely not located at the true value of the
parameter. Since this is mathematical obvious, I find astounding that it can be
used as a logical argument against some statistical approaches to testing.
4. TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE BAYESIAN VERSION OF THE
PARADOX
While the divergence between the frequentist and Bayesian answers is reflecting
upon the difference between the paradigms in terms of purpose and evaluation,
rather than condemning one of the approaches as implied by Spanos (2013), the
(Bayesian) debate about constructing limiting Bayes factors or posterior prob-
abilities that include improper prior modelling stands both open and relevant.
DeGroot’s (1982) warning that “diffuse prior distributions (...) must be used with
care” has now been impressed upon generations of students and it is indeed a
fair warning. There remains nonetheless a crucial need to produce assessments of
null hypotheses from a Bayesian perspective and under limited prior information,
once again without any incentive whatsoever to mimic, reproduce or even come
close to frequentist solutions like p-values.
Robert (1993) suggested selecting the prior weights of the two hypotheses,
(̺0, 1−̺0) towards compensating for the increased mass produced by the alterna-
18While this is very much unlikely to be advocated either by the author or by Bayesian
statisticians, we note that, as a statistics, i.e. a transform of the data, both the Bayes factor and
the likelihood ratio could be processed in exactly the same way to produce severity thresholds
of their own. See also Johnson and Rossell (2010) and Johnson (2013) for the related notion of
uniformly most powerful Bayesian tests.
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tive hypothesis prior.19 While the solution therein produced results that brought
a numerical proximity with the (standard) p-value, its construction is flawed from
a measure-theoretic perspective since the determination of the weights involves
the value of the prior density π1 at the point-null value θ0,
̺0 = (1− ̺0)π1(θ0) ,
while a probability density is only defined almost everywhere. This difficulty is
shared by the Savage–Dickey paradox representing the Bayes factor solely in
terms of the prior density under the alternative hypothesis (Robert and Marin,
2009).20 I nonetheless second this opinion that the degree of freedom represented
by the prior weight ̺0 in the Bayesian formalism should not be neglected to
overcome the difficulty in using improper priors.21
Among several available resolutions (see, e.g., Robert, 2001, Chapter 5), a
further step worth mentioning is Berger et al.’s (1998) partial validation of the
use of identical improper priors on the nuisance parameters, a notion already
entertained by Jeffreys (see the discussion in Robert et al., 2009, Section 6.3).
While arguing about the case of the“same” constant in both models as validating
picking the “same” improper prior for both models has neither mathematical
nor statistical validation, relying on the same prior quite handily eliminates the
major thorn in the side of Bayesian testing of hypotheses. As demonstrated in
Marin and Robert (2007) and Celeux et al. (2012), it allows in particular for the
use of a partly improper g-prior in linear and generalised linear models (Zellner,
1986).22
A last step towards the incorporation of improper priors within the Bayesian
testing paraphenalia is the recent investigation of the use of score functions
S(x,m) that extend the standard log score function associated with the Bayes
factor:
logB12(x) = logm1(x)− logm2(x) = S0(x,m1)− S0(x,m2) ,
where mi is the prior predictive associated with model Mi. Indeed, there exists a
whole family of proper scoring rules that are independent from the normalising
constant of the prior predictive (Parry et al., 2012) and can thus be used on im-
proper priors as well. For instance, Hyva¨rinen’s (2005) score is one of these scores.
While the scores are delicate to calibrate, i.e. the magnitude of S(x,m1)−S(x,m2)
is not absolute, they provide a consistent method for selecting models (Berger,
1985) and avoid the delicate issue of selecting priors that differ for model selec-
tion and for regular inference (conditional on the model). This is why Sprenger
19The compensation cannot be of a probabilistic nature in that the overall mass of an im-
proper prior remains infinite for any weighting scheme.
20A solution to the above measure-theoretic difficulties is to impose a version of pi1 that is
continuous at θ0 so that pi1(θ0) is uniquely defined. It however does not escape controversy as
it equates the values of two density functions under two orthogonal measures, the Lebesgue
measure and a Dirac measure.
21Some will object at this choice on Bayesian grounds as it implies that the prior does depend
on the sample size n.
22Once again, choosing g = n should attract criticism from some Bayesian corners for be-
ing dependent on the sample size, even though it boils down to picking an imaginary sample
(Smith and Spiegelhalter, 1982) size of 1. See Liang et al. (2008) for an alternative approach
setting an hyperprior on g.
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(2013) advises replacing the Bayes factor with a logarithmic score, rewritten as
E
pi [Eθ{log f(X|θ)/f(X|θ0)}|x] ,
and compared with an acceptance bound. The Kullback–Leibler divergence used
in this score is utterly natural in terms of evaluating the impact of replacing
one distribution with the other. And, as stressed by Sprenger (2013), it does not
“involve commitment to the truth or likelihood of H0”. The use of this score
however requires the choice of an acceptance bound, which calibration is not
provided by the theory.
5. REFLECTIONS
Even though I almost uniformly disagree with the presentation of the Jeffreys–
Lindley’s paradox found in his paper, I am most grateful to Aris Spanos for rekin-
dling my interest in the paradox and inducing me to spell out my thoughts on the
topic in an organised manner. This paper has provided a perspective on the foun-
dations of Bayesian inference towards testing statistical hypotheses, including the
recovery of (some) improper priors for this purpose, and on the reasons why the
severity-based approach of Mayo and Spanos (2004) fails as a convincing alter-
native to and criticism of the existing branches of statistical hypothesis testing. I
argued against the notion that the discrepancy between frequentist and Bayesian
procedures was a paradox, even when occuring asymptotically. I also disputed
the common argument that the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox prohibits the use of
improper priors, but instead called for the use of score and predictive procedures
in this context.
The appeal of great paradoxes23 is to address foundational issues in a field,
either to reinforce the arguments in favour of a given theory or, on the opposite,
to cast serious doubts on its validity. The fact that the Jeffreys–Lindley’s paradox
is still discussed in papers (as exemplified by Spanos, 2013 and Sprenger, 2013
in the current journal) and blogs, by statisticians and non-statisticians alike, is a
testimony to its impact on the debate about the deepest foundations of statistical
testing. The irrevocable opposition between frequentist and Bayesian approaches
to testing, but also the persistent impact of the prior modelling in this case, are
fundamental questions that have not yet met with definitive answers. And they
presumably never will for, as aptly put by Lad (2003), “the weight of Lindley’s
paradoxical result (...) burdens proponents of the Bayesian practice”. However,
this is a burden with highly positive features in that it paradoxically drives the
field to higher grounds, like the devising of novel decisional tools assessing deeper
and better the impact of a particular model choice, when compared with the
Bayes factor solution producing a unique number.24
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